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I. INTRODUCTION
Being sued is bad enough when you expect it, but a surprise
lawsuit is even worse. Suppose that you are a senior manager of a
company that has just conducted its annual employee performance
appraisals. Jane and Jeff, two of the employees whose appraisals
you have just examined, are married to each other and work in the
same office. After reading unfavorable performance reviews about
each of them, you add their names to a potential termination list. A
few hours after you read the reviews, however, you learn that Jeff
has filed a Title VII lawsuit against your company alleging
religious discrimination.1 Having a basic grasp of Title VII from
your general counsel’s previous advice, you recognize that firing
Jeff so shortly after learning of his discrimination claim would
potentially expose you to additional liability.2 Despite your
legitimate basis for terminating him, doing so could result in his
suing your company on additional grounds, claiming that you
terminated him in retaliation for his initial complaint.
Perhaps you may even refrain from terminating Jane during
this period. While you probably would not assume that firing her
would expose your company to a retaliation claim, you may
nevertheless feel some concern over the appearance that her
termination would create. At the very least, you may worry that
terminating her would heighten any tension between your company
and Jeff resulting from his lawsuit. You may fear that as a
consequence of Jane’s termination, the already disgruntled Jeff
would become even more displeased with the company and
perhaps even more aggressive with his suit.
Now, suppose that a year later your company again completes
performance appraisals. Upon reading a poor review of your
employee Mark, you decide to fire him. Mark works in a different
office than Jeff and Jane, and, as far as you know, he has no
affiliation with either spouse. Soon after you fire Mark, though,
you receive notice that he has filed a Title VII retaliation suit
against your company. You are surprised to learn that he is a friend
of Jeff. You are also shocked by Mark’s allegation that he was
fired in retaliation for Jeff’s initial discrimination claim. Based on
everything that you know about Title VII, you never expected to
face a retaliation claim from a third party who engaged in no Title
VII-protected activity himself.
Copyright 2013, by LAURA BLAIR NAQUIN.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
2. See id. § 2000e-3(a).
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In 2011, the United States Supreme Court opened the floodgates
for this type of unexpected claim when it allowed a third-party
plaintiff to recover for a Title VII retaliation claim in Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP.3 In this case, the Court recognized a
retaliation claim brought by the fiancé of a woman who had filed a
prior Title VII discrimination claim.4 However, the Court refused to
designate classes of third-party plaintiffs who may recover under
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, thereby exposing employers to
unprecedented liability from an unpredictable array of potential
plaintiffs.5 To limit its liability effectively, an employer must know
not only which behavior may form the basis of a claim but also who
can file it. The law after Thompson fails to provide employers with
this basic level of certainty, though, because any third party can
currently file a Title VII retaliation claim against his employer.
Accordingly, employers need a standard defining which third parties
can file these claims.
This Comment proposes a standard for determining which thirdparty plaintiffs can bring Title VII retaliation claims against their
employers. The proposed standard is rooted in principles of tort law,
which are appropriate both because of Title VII’s evolution into a
statutory tort and because of the Supreme Court’s application of tort
law principles to other employment discrimination issues.6
Specifically, the requirements for the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED), or bystander damages, may be used as a
model for third-party retaliation claims. Claims for NIED must
satisfy the elements of familial relationship, temporal proximity, and
spatial proximity.7 These elements also address considerations
pertinent to third-party Title VII retaliation claims. This Comment
analyzes different states’ requirements for NIED claims and
ultimately proposes a standard for determining which third-party
plaintiffs may bring Title VII retaliation claims.
Part I of this Comment describes the origin, evolution, and
substance of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. This Part also
discusses the United States Supreme Court’s recent expansion of
Title VII retaliation claims by broadening the definition of
retaliation, the categories of actions deemed retaliatory, and the
class of plaintiffs eligible to file retaliation claims. Part II discusses
the Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII retaliation claims to
3. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
4. Id. at 868.
5. Id.
6. See discussion infra Part I.A; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186
(2011); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1977).
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recognize third-party plaintiffs in its 2011 decision, Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP.8 Then, Part III explores Thompson’s
ramifications and asserts the need for establishing a standard for
third-party Title VII retaliation claims.9 Finally, Part IV proposes a
standard rooted in principles of NIED to govern these retaliation
claims.
A synthesis of various states’ requirements for these claims
forms the basis of the proposed standard for third-party Title VII
retaliation claims. This standard examines the relationship between
the third-party plaintiff and the coworker who engaged in the
initial Title VII-protected activity. It also considers the elapsed
time between the initial protected activity and the alleged
retaliation, as well as the proximity in which the two employees
worked. The proposed standard will balance Title VII’s policy
goals against employers’ concerns and will ultimately satisfy both
competing interests.
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND APPLICATION
A. Evolution of Title VII
While Congress had considered a bill supporting civil rights
each year between 1945 and 1957, it did not pass the first civil
rights bill of the twentieth century until the 1957 Civil Rights Act,
which focused on voting rights.10 The next Civil Rights Act
followed in 1960 and expanded the rights provided by the 1957
legislation.11 Soon afterwards, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to eradicate discrimination in both employment and
public accommodations.12 The Act did not, however, extend to
gender discrimination until the day before the House of
Representatives voted on the legislation, when an opponent
proposed an amendment to extend its protections to women.13 This
8. 131 S. Ct. at 868.
9. Id.
10. Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, THE DIRKSEN CONG.
CTR., http://www.congresslink.org/printbasicshistmatscivilrights64text.htm (last
visited October 12, 2011).
11. Id.
12. Anita G. Schausten, Retaliation Against Third Parties: A Potential
Loophole in Title VII’s Discrimination Protection, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1313, 1314 (2004).
13. Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (1967). While African
Americans uniquely endured some forms of oppression forbidden by the Act,
women of the era faced similar discrimination in employment. Id.
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was an unsuccessful attempt to thwart the bill’s passage, but it
resulted in a Civil Rights Act that protected individuals based on
race, color, religion, national origin, and gender.14
Since its enactment, the purpose and application of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have undergone dramatic change.15
Congress’ goal when enacting Title VII was threefold: (1) to effect
broad social change; (2) to boost productivity through increasing
the country’s human capital; and (3) to repair the country’s
international reputation, which had been blighted by persistent
racial discrimination.16 The initial purpose of Title VII’s provision
for attorney’s fees was to incentivize individuals’ enforcement of
the statute.17 In effect, “the Title VII plaintiff acted ‘not for himself
alone but also as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority.’”18 Even after
Title VII’s 1972 amendment granted litigation authority to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the private
right of action continued to play an important role beyond mere
reparation of individual damages because it furthered the public
interest of eradicating discrimination.19
Despite its lofty origins, Title VII has grown to resemble a
statutory tort through the evolution of several facets of
employment discrimination claims.20 For example, while the
majority of early Title VII plaintiffs complained of employers’
widespread refusal to hire, since the 1980s, employees have more
14. Id. at 877.
15. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to
Employment of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 196 (1993).
16. Id. at 189; Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate
Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 555,
580–83 (1985); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation As a Cold War Imperative, 41
STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (1988) (proposing that the apparent contradictions
between American political ideology and American race relations created
problems in foreign policy); Schausten, supra note 12; Major Features, supra
note 10 (describing the rampant racial discrimination prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Acts of the late 1950s and early 1960s, elaborating that segregation
in public facilities and schools was so pervasive throughout the South that even
by 1963, only 12,000 of the 3,000,000 Southern African Americans attended
integrated schools, and that racism similarly pervaded many employers’ hiring
decisions).
17. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189.
18. Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
19. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189–90; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S.
590, 595 (1981).
20. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196.

674

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

frequently protested individual termination or promotion
decisions.21 This transformation contributed to the sentiment that
the statute had succeeded in reducing employment discrimination
so that it ceased to pose a serious problem.22 Following this
paradigm shift, the EEOC of the 1980s turned its focus from
increasing the percentage of minorities in labor markets to
advocating victim-specific relief.23
Similarly, the Supreme Court changed its stance on
employment discrimination, no longer considering it “a class based
phenomenon with societal causes, but [instead a] series of discrete,
aberrant acts by individuals harboring personal hostility toward the
victim.”24 Through strengthening its support for victim-specific
outcomes, the Court demonstrated its changed views. Early Title
VII plaintiffs frequently filed their claims as class actions,
conforming to the initial view that the purpose of Title VII was to
eliminate pervasive discrimination in employment.25 However,
class action discrimination suits began to lose favor with the Court
in the 1970s,26 and by the 1980s individual suits comprised the
overwhelming majority of Title VII claims.27 This shift led courts
to examine “individuals’ private circumstances, rather than . . .
systematic business practices” to grant individual damages.28 This
modern practice starkly contrasts with the Supreme Court’s
21. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983–84 (1991).
22. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 194.
23. Id. at 196. See also Statements Before House Labor Subcommittee on
Employment Opportunities on Use of Goals and Timetables by EEOC, 1986
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at E-1 (Mar. 12, 1986); Kenneth B. Noble,
Anger and Elation at Ruling on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987,
§ 4, at 1; Policy Changes: Aggressive Enforcement Will Mark Next Term at
EEOC, Thomas Says, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at A-6 (Nov. 15,
1984).
24. Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining
Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943,
945 (1984).
25. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338–39 (1980)
(restricting attorney fee awards in class actions because of the Court’s opinion
that they promote frivolous litigation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147 (1982) (requiring all members of a class, along with their
representative, to claim injury arising from the same employment practice); E.
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (decertifying a
class because some of its representatives had been unqualified for the positions
that they were discriminatorily denied, even though the employer rejected them
without examining their qualifications).
26. See Deposit, 445 U.S. at 338–39; see also Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at
147; E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 431 U.S. at 395.
27. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196.
28. Id.
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original rejection of a tort model for Title VII and denial of
compensatory damages to Title VII plaintiffs.29
At one time, the Supreme Court denied compensatory damages
under Title VII, considering them too unrelated to the statute’s
mission of eliminating widespread employment discrimination.30
Congress, however, disagreed with this position, as evidenced by
its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which changed the
law to allow recovery of even punitive damages.31 Accordingly,
the Court now embraces Title VII individual damages.32 In fact,
the Court even acknowledges that Title VII functions as a statutory
tort, even referring to it as such.33 Since its enactment, Title VII
has thus, through the actions of the Supreme Court and Congress,
transformed into a legislatively created tort in terms of its stated
purpose and application.34
B. Overview of Title VII
While some aspects of Title VII have changed over the years, its
basic goal of eliminating discrimination has remained constant. Title
VII contains two distinct prohibitions: one against discrimination

29. Id.
30. Id. (“Title VII was ‘regarded as a mechanism to furnish relief and
restitution to victims of a social evil, not to create a new cause of action for
personal injuries “otherwise actionable.”’”) (quoting Whitney v. Greater N.Y.
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
31. Stephen A. Plass, Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the
Future of Equal Employment Laws, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 313, 358–60 (1992).
32. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196.
33. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (providing an
affirmative defense to supervisor harassment claims). See also Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2011) (calling USERRA (Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act) a “federal tort”); Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (analyzing Title VII claim
under tort framework); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (referencing “the statutory employment ‘tort’ created
by Title VII”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 249 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“The purposes and operation of Title VII are closely analogous to
those of tort law . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006).
34. This Comment takes no position on whether Title VII’s transformation
was a positive or negative change. Instead, it merely acknowledges the current
tort-like state of the law and accordingly suggests that tort law principles serve
as a useful and logical basis for defining a class of third-party Title VII
retaliation plaintiffs.
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and the other against retaliation.35 The antidiscrimination provision
stipulates that an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”36 The antiretaliation provision, in
turn, prohibits employers from
discriminat[ing] against any of his employees or applicants
for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.37
The Supreme Court has held that the primary purpose of the
antiretaliation provision is to ensure the enforcement of Title VII’s
substantive provision.38 This proposition is certainly logical—if
employees had no remedy against their employers’ retaliation, they
would derive no real benefit from antidiscrimination laws. Any
remedy granted to such unprotected plaintiffs for their employers’
discrimination would be mitigated by employers’ unrestricted
ability to penalize complaining employees. The Court has further
described the purpose of the antiretaliation provision as ensuring
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”39 Beyond
merely maintaining access to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms,
however, the Supreme Court has actually increased the availability
of these mechanisms in recent years by taking an increasingly
expansive view of retaliation claims.40
C. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Retaliation Claims in Recent
Years
Employees are filing a rapidly increasing number of retaliation
claims. Between 1997 and 2009, the percentage of Title VII
retaliation claims rose from 20% to 31% of all claims filed with the

35. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also includes a provision creating the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to govern its enforcement. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
38. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57.
39. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
40. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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EEOC.41 This trend correlates with the Supreme Court’s
increasingly broad construction of Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision. The Court justifies this liberal interpretation based on
differences in wording between Title VII’s substantive ban on
discrimination and its ban on retaliation.42
1. Expansion of the Definition of Employee—Robinson v. Shell
Oil
The Supreme Court first expanded its protection of employees
under Title VII in Robinson v. Shell Oil, in which it held that the
term employee includes former employees.43 In this case, Charles
Robinson, a former Shell Oil (Shell) employee, initially filed an
EEOC charge claiming that Shell had fired him in violation of Title
VII.44 Subsequently, Mr. Robinson applied for a position with
another company, to which Shell gave a negative reference.45 Mr.
Robinson proceeded to file a retaliation claim against Shell, alleging
that the company had provided the negative reference in retaliation
for his initial complaint.46 He prevailed on this retaliation claim
because the Supreme Court held that the term employee in Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision encompassed both current and former
employees.47 In so holding, the Court departed from prior

41. Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
42. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 62–63. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting an employer from “fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise . . .
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” or “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or
classify[ing] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” based on a protected
characteristic), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting an employer
from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter”) (emphasis added). See also Susan M. Omilian
& Jean P. Kamp, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.06 (1990).
43. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 337.
44. Id. at 339.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 340.
47. Id. at 346.
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jurisprudence, which had only included current employees within
the scope of the provision.48
2. Expansion of the Definition of Discrimination—Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White
After broadening the definition of employee under Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision, the Supreme Court turned to another
element of these claims, namely, discrimination. The circuits were
split over the term’s definition prior to the Supreme Court’s
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White decision.49 The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied the most restrictive standard to
the term—the “ultimate employment decision” standard.50 This
standard considered retaliatory conduct to constitute discrimination
under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision only when it rose to the
level of decisions “such as hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating.”51 Other circuits, including the
Sixth, instead applied the same definition of discrimination for
retaliation claims that they applied to the underlying discrimination
claims.52 This more expansive standard only required plaintiffs to
show that the employer’s retaliatory action caused “an adverse
effect on the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of employment.”53
Because of the conflicting approaches, the Supreme Court
stepped in to resolve the circuit split. In Burlington Northern, the
Supreme Court defined discrimination under Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision to include “any adverse treatment that is
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.”54
This definition of discrimination encompasses an even broader
range of activities than those covered under Title VII’s substantive

48. Id.
49. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
50. Id. at 60 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir.
2001)).
51. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 60 (quoting Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
52. Id. at 60.
53. Id. at 60–61 (quoting Von Gunten, 243 F. 3d at 866).
54. Id. at 66 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-13 (1998))
[hereinafter EEOC MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy
/docs/retal.pdf). See also EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, REFERENCE MANUAL
TO T ITLE VII LAW FOR COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL § 491.2 (1972) (Section 704(a)
“is intended to provide ‘exceptionally broad protection’ for protestors of
discriminatory employment practices.”).

2013]

COMMENT

679

antidiscrimination provision.55 So, the Burlington Northern
definition reaches further than even the more expansive of the two
interpretations previously followed by the circuits.56 Under the
Burlington standard, therefore, employer activities that do not
constitute discrimination under Title VII’s substantive provision
may nonetheless constitute discrimination under the antiretaliation
provision.57
III. THE CREATION OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING FOR TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIMS
The next logical step after the Supreme Court’s expansion of
the definitions of employee and discrimination under Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision was the expansion of the class of plaintiffs
who may file retaliation claims. Prior to Thompson, the circuits
were split over the proper standard for analyzing third-party
retaliation claims under Title VII.58 Some circuits rejected these
claims altogether, instead adhering to the plain language of Title
VII, which does not specifically provide for third-party plaintiffs.59
Others recognized third-party retaliation claims, considering them
supported by the legislative intent underlying Title VII.60 In
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
56. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 60–61.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” (emphasis added)). The Supreme
Court held that Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company unlawfully
retaliated against Sheila White for her previously filed discrimination complaint
against the company by suspending her without pay and reassigning her duties.
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 73. Though Burlington reassigned White to perform
tasks that were within her job description, the Court determined that the change
in duties was “materially adverse” because the new duties were less desirable
than her former ones. Id.
58. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 808–11 (6th
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
59. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
60. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
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accordance with its previous expansion of retaliation claims, the
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the latter approach in
Thompson.61 It reasoned that withholding the cause of action from
third parties would constitute an “artificially narrow reading” of
Title VII and thus permitted third-party Title VII retaliation
claims.62
A. Third-Party Retaliation Claims—The Pre-Thompson Circuit
Split
Third-party retaliation claims differ markedly from traditional
retaliation claims. A traditional plaintiff seeking redress under
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision establishes a prima facie case
by demonstrating that (1) he took part in an activity protected by
Title VII; (2) his employer committed an adverse employment
action against him; and (3) his protected activity motivated the
employer’s adverse employment action.63 A third-party retaliation
claim, in contrast, arises when one employee engages in Title VIIprotected activity, but the employer retaliates against a different
employee, who then files suit.64 While the Supreme Court had
previously established that Title VII protects third parties who
engage in protected behavior on behalf of their coworkers, “pure”
third-party plaintiffs fall short of this criteria.65 These plaintiffs
necessarily fail to meet the first prong of a retaliation claim—
participation in a protected activity—because a third-party plaintiff
did not previously engage in protected activity.66
Because third-party plaintiffs do not fit the conventional
criteria for Title VII retaliation claims, different circuit courts took
different approaches when determining whether to allow third-

61. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
62. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
63. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
65. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
555 U.S. 271 (2009) (extending Title VII protection from retaliation to
employees who oppose discrimination on behalf of coworkers in certain
circumstances). When discussing third-party Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, this
Comment refers to these “pure” third-party plaintiffs who have personally
engaged in no protected activity.
66. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third
Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931,
933–34 (2007).
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party retaliation claims.67 Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in Thompson, the circuit courts had applied two main
standards to these claims, either adhering to the plain language of
Title VII or adopting a more expansive approach, such as
interpreting it purposively.68
1. Purposive Interpretation of Title VII
Some circuits, espousing a purposive approach, liberally
construed Title VII. These circuits allowed third-party retaliation
claims because they deemed the claims to further Title VII’s
purpose of providing “‘unfettered access’ to [the statute’s]
remedial mechanisms.”69 The Eleventh Circuit and, initially, the
Sixth Circuit utilized a purposive approach and allowed third-party
Title VII retaliation claims.70 Some district courts and the EEOC
subscribed to this philosophy as well.71
The Eleventh Circuit in Wu v. Thomas, for instance, recognized
a husband’s claim for retaliation under Title VII even though he
had not personally engaged in activity protected by Title VII.72 The
court decided that he could sue under Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision because his wife, and coworker, had previously filed a
67. John J. Feeney, An Inevitable Progression in the Scope of Title VII’s
Antiretaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP. U.L. REV.
643, 652–55 (2010).
68. Id. In addition to cases specifically addressing the antiretaliation
provision of Title VII, this Comment refers to cases interpreting the
antiretaliation provisions of the ADA and ADEA for additional guidance on the
interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. See Schausten, supra note
12, at 1322–23 (“Because cases under Title VII, the Americans with Disability
Act (‘ADA’) [42 U.S.C. §12206], and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(‘ADEA’) [29 U.S.C. §623(d)] all tend to be analyzed similarly in relation to
retaliation, courts use cases from all three statutes as precedent in making their
decisions.”); see also Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir.
2002) (“[P]recedent interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to
interpretation of the others.”).
69. Angela J. Schnell, But I Love Him! Why the Sixth Circuit Erred in
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP by Denying a Third Party
Retaliation Claim Under Title VII, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 909,
919 (2010).
70. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
71. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); DeMedina v.
Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36
F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Assoc., Inc.,
No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999); EEOC
MANUAL § 8-10, supra note 54.
72. Wu, 863 F.2d at 1547–48.

682

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Title VII discrimination claim.73 Even though the husband was a
third party, the court recognized his claim because the employer’s
retaliatory action impacted his wife, the initial Title VII claimant.74
Similarly, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit initially
applied a purposive approach to Title VII retaliation claims in
Thompson.75 The court determined that the purpose of Title VII
supports third-party retaliation claims.76 It held that “Title VII
prohibit[s] employers from taking retaliatory action against
employees not directly involved in protected activity, but who are so
closely related to or associated with those who are directly involved,
that it is clear that the protected activity motivated the employer’s
action” because “such conduct would undermine the purposes of
Title VII.”77 The court additionally noted that a literal reading of
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision runs contrary to the intent of
Title VII.78 It concluded that, under the Burlington standard, an
employer’s retaliation against a family member would discourage
“reasonable workers” from filing discrimination claims.79
Like the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, several district courts
have allowed spouses to file third-party retaliation claims.80 A few
district courts have even extended these claims to siblings.81 The
EEOC also supports third-party retaliation claims, considering
them to be covered by Title VII’s prohibition against “retaliation
against someone so closely related to or associated with the person
exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage that
person from pursuing those rights.”82
2. Literal Interpretation of Title VII
Instead of following a purposive approach, the Eighth, Third,
Fifth, and, eventually, Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals interpreted

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1548.
75. Thompson, 520 F.3d at 647.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 646.
78. Id. at 647.
79. Id.
80. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); DeMedina v.
Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978).
81. EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 1998);
Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Assoc., Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL
287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999).
82. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 54, at § 8-10.
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Title VII’s antiretaliation provision literally.83 These circuits
reached the conclusion that third-party retaliation claims were
invalid because the express language of Title VII does not provide
for them.84 As an additional rationale for prohibiting these claims,
the Third Circuit cites the potentially limitless liability to which
third-party retaliation claims would subject employers.85
The Eighth Circuit, in Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., refused to
recognize third-party retaliation claims, holding steadfastly that
only the person who took part in the initial protected activity may
file a Title VII retaliation claim.86 In Riceland, an employee who
lived with a coworker filed discrimination charges against her
employer, which later fired the coworker.87 The coworker, in turn,
filed suit under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision; however, the
Eighth Circuit held that he did not have a valid claim because he
had not engaged in any protected activity himself.88
The Third Circuit likewise rejected third-party retaliation
claims in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc.89 The court
acknowledged that Title VII’s purpose could potentially support
the recognition of third-party retaliation claims.90 However,
because it did not find “that adherence to the statute’s plain text
would be absurd,” it determined that the plain language of the
statute should control.91 Using similar logic, the Fifth Circuit
rejected third-party retaliation claims in Holt v. JTM Industries.92
The court
recognize[d] that there is a possible risk that an employer
will discriminate against a complaining employee’s relative
or friend in retaliation for the complaining employee’s
83. Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998); Fogleman
v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002); Holt v. JTM Indus., 89
F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing retaliation under the ADEA);
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009),
rev’d 131 S. Ct. 836 (2011).
84. Feeney, supra note 67, at 665–66. See also Thompson, 567 F.3d at 808;
Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226; Smith, 151 F.3d at 819.
85. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
86. Smith, 151 F.3d at 813.
87. Id. at 815–16.
88. Id. at 813.
89. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571.
90. Id. at 569.
91. Id. at 570.
92. Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing
retaliation under the ADEA). But see Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 727
(5th Cir. 1986) (commenting that “employee opposition to discriminatory
employment practices directed against a fellow employee” could be considered
protected activity under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision).
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actions . . . [but] . . . believe[d] that the language that
Congress has employed . . . will better protect employees
against retaliation than [the court] could by trying to define
the types of relationships that should render automatic
standing [for third parties].93
Finally, after briefly recognizing third-party retaliation claims,
the Sixth Circuit reversed its position.94 Upon its rehearing en banc
of Thompson, the court vacated its original decision and affirmed
the district court’s holding “that § 704(a) of Title VII does not
create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who
have not personally engaged in protected activity.”95 The Sixth
Circuit based its decision on the established principle that “[w]hen
the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to
enforce it according to its terms.”96 The court determined that the
antiretaliation provision’s plain wording limits the class of
antiretaliation plaintiffs to individuals who have personally
engaged in protected activities, a result that it did not consider
absurd.97 Because Thompson had not engaged in any protected
activity, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporation.98
B. Thompson v. North American Stainless—The Recognition of
Third-Party Standing in Title VII Retaliation Claims
Relying on its Burlington Northern definition of discrimination,
the Supreme Court continued its expansion of Title VII’s protections
by allowing third-party retaliation claims in Thompson.99 Eric
Thompson and his then-fiancée Miriam Regalado both worked for
North American Stainless until 2003. That year, the corporation
fired Thompson three weeks after receiving notice that Regalado
had filed a Title VII discrimination claim against their employer.100
Subsequently, Thompson filed a Title VII retaliation claim against
North American Stainless, alleging that his termination was
93. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
94. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir.
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 807 (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291 (2006)).
97. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 805.
98. Id. at 805–06.
99. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006);
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
100. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
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retaliation for Regalado’s discrimination charge.101 The district court
dismissed Thompson’s retaliation claim on summary judgment,
reasoning that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation
claims.”102 The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court,103
but on rehearing en banc the court vacated its previous decision.104
The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision granting
summary judgment to North American Stainless.105 In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
third parties may, in fact, file suit under Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision even when they do not engage in any protected activity.106
The Supreme Court first examined whether North American’s
alleged retaliation against Thompson violated Title VII.107 It
answered this question in the affirmative, citing Burlington for the
proposition that the statute’s antiretaliation provision encompasses
a wide range of employer conduct.108 The Court explained that
Title VII “prohibits any employer action that well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.”109 Further, the Court reasoned that a reasonable
worker may be discouraged from engaging in protected activity if
he knew that his fiancée would be fired as a result.110 The Supreme
Court declined to define a category of third parties against whom
retaliation would be unlawful.111 Instead, it surmised that “firing a
close family member” would “almost always” be unlawful, while
“inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance . . . almost
never” would.112 The Court stated that the circumstances of each
case must determine whether retaliation against a third party
constituted a Title VII violation.113 It did, however, emphasize that
an objective determination of injury is necessary to “avoi[d] the
101. Id.
102. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639
(E.D. Ky. 2006), rev’d, 520 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2008).
103. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). See discussion supra Part I.D.2
104. Thompson, v. North American Stainless, LP, No. 07-5040, 2008 WL
6191996 (6th Cir. Jul. 28, 2008). See discussion supra Part I.D.2
105. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 805–06 (6th
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
106. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
107. Id. at 867–68.
108. Id.; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006).
109. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 548 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 868–69 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at
68–69).
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uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial
effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”114
In its analysis of third-party standing for Title VII retaliation
claims, the Supreme Court admitted that person[s] aggrieved who
may sue under the statute must encompass a narrower class than
mere Article III standing.115 The term excludes plaintiffs “who
might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose
interests are unrelated to Title VII’s statutory prohibitions.”116 On
the other hand, the Court advised that limiting person aggrieved to
the initial participant in Title VII-protected activity is an artificially
narrow reading.117 Between the two extremes, the Court offered
the standard applied by the Administrative Procedure Act,118
allowing any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved . . .
within the meaning of a relevant statute” to sue a federal agency.119
The Court reasoned that this language allows a plaintiff to sue if
his claim falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the
statute, the violation of which gives rise to the complaint.120 The
Supreme Court noted that Title VII is intended to protect
employees from their employers’ illegal actions.121 Because
Thompson suffered from his employer’s illegal retaliation, the
Court explained, he fell within the zone of interests protected by
Title VII. It therefore concluded that Thompson had standing for
his Title VII retaliation claim.122
IV. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN TITLE
VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
The Supreme Court decided Thompson in accordance with
scholars’ predictions that the Court would continue its recent trend
of broadening Title VII retaliation claims.123 This jurisprudential
expansion follows the notion that third-party retaliation claims
should be permitted because their prohibition would limit
employees’ access to Title VII due to the fear of reprisal.124 In fact,
114. Id. at 868–69 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 869.
116. Id. at 870.
117. Id. at 869–70.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
119. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702).
120. Id. See also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883, n.110
(1990) (proposing zone of interests test for plaintiffs suing under federal
statutes).
121. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869–70.
122. Id.
123. Feeney, supra note 67, at 652–55.
124. Schnell, supra note 69, at 921.
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the decision “closes a loophole some courts—and employers—had
found in Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.”125 The Court’s
liberalization of retaliation claims also represents a welcome step
for those who argued in favor of further expansion of Title VII
retaliation claims.126 Finally, it satisfies those who support
retaliation claims because they maintain the “integrity of the rule
of law” and should thus be broadly construed to provide greater
protection.127
In broadening Title VII retaliation claims, the Thompson Court
rejected the defendant corporation’s argument that allowing third
parties who engaged in no protected activity to file Title VII
retaliation claims would “place the employer at risk any time it
fires any employee who happens to have a connection to a
different employee who filed a charge with the EEOC.”128 The
Court dismissed this position, stating that an employer’s desire for
predictability did not justify the preclusion of all third-party
reprisals.129 Employers’ concern about unexpected plaintiffs may
not merit a blanket prohibition on all third-party retaliation claims,
but there is no reason to preclude a standard governing these
claims. On the contrary, such guidelines are necessary for the
limitation of the otherwise infinite range of third-party plaintiffs.
A. The Need for a Standard Governing Third-Party Standing in
Title VII Retaliation Claims
Presently, any employee who has had any contact with a
coworker who has engaged in Title VII-protected activity may
bring a Title VII retaliation claim.130 The absence of a standard
governing these claims leaves employers vulnerable to lawsuits
from any number of unforeseen plaintiffs.131 This development,
coupled with the recent increase in Title VII retaliation claims,
could cause employers to incur substantial legal fees defending
125. David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya: Employee Retaliation Claims Play
Big Before the High Court, 97 A.B.A. J. 21, 21 (2011) (quoting Lawrence
Rosenthal, professor of employment discrimination law at Northern Kentucky
University’s Salmon P. Chase College of Law).
126. Id.
127. R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in Today’s
Workplace, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 749, 749–57 (2011).
128. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
129. Id.
130. See id. (“Firing a close family member” would “almost always” be
unlawful, while “inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance” would
“almost never” be.).
131. Id.
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baseless allegations that they could never have anticipated.132
Some scholars suggest that merely requiring “the third party to
meet all of the normal requirements of a retaliation claim” would
eliminate the potential for abuse through frivolous lawsuits.133
However, the merits of retaliation claims are often indeterminable
upon a preliminary showing.134 Because these claims frequently
entail analysis of suspect timing and witness credibility, judges
often leave these factual determinations to juries.135 Even if such a
claim is unfounded, the employer may nevertheless expend
considerable resources before it is dismissed. While employers
may, of course, have to defend themselves against some baseless
claims in any area of the law, the potential number of meritless
third-party retaliation claims is staggering after Thompson.136 Now
any employee has standing to sue for retaliation based on any
coworker’s Title VII-protected activity. For a large corporation,
that translates into a myriad of potential retaliation claims.
Employers need to be able to make employment decisions,
including those to take adverse actions against employees. If the
risk of retaliation suits is too nebulous, it may alter employer’s
decisions, impairing the business’s daily operations. Therefore,
employers need a standard for determining third parties’ standing
in Title VII retaliation claims.
B. Rationale for Applying Tort Standard
Over the years, Title VII has evolved from a “private attorney
general” mechanism into, essentially, a statutory tort.137
Accordingly, tort law principles provide an appropriate source for
a standard governing third-party Title VII retaliation claims.
Recently, the Supreme Court borrowed from tort law to devise a
standard for employment discrimination claims in Staub v. Proctor
132. Charge Statistics, supra note 41.
133. Feeney, supra note 67, at 669–70 (A plaintiff meeting the “normal
requirements” of a retaliation claim must show that he engaged in Title VIIprotected activity and that his employer consequently retaliated against him.).
134. See Gregory P. Kult, Retaliation Claims Take Center Stage,
EMPLOYMENT LAW IN BRIEF, 2 (May 31, 2011), http://www.martindale.com
/members/ArticleAtachment.aspx?od=814019&id=1291842&filename=asr-129
1846.docx.pdf.
135. The term suspect timing refers to “close timing between an employee’s
protected activity and an adverse employment action.” See Shackelford v.
DeLoitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing suspect
timing); see also Kult, supra note 134, at 2.
136. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
137. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189; Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See also discussion supra Part I.A.
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Hospital.138 This cat’s-paw discrimination case involved an alleged
violation of The Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), a federal statute that
closely resembles Title VII.139 The Court initially noted that when
examining federal torts, it applies general tort law principles.140
Thus, it determined that the tort theory of proximate cause was the
appropriate standard for determining employers’ liability in cat’spaw discrimination cases.141 Proximate cause “requires only ‘some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged,’ and excludes only those ‘link[s] that are too
remote, purely contingent, or indirect.’”142 So, an employer is
liable under USERRA if (1) a supervisor is motivated by
antimilitary sentiment; (2) that supervisor takes an adverse
employment action; and (3) the antimilitary sentiment proximately
caused the action.143
The Staub Court’s proclaimation that “when Congress creates a
federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law” applies
138. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (U.S. 2011).
139. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
1186 (2011) (This case addressed a cat’s-paw discrimination claim. This type of
claim arises when an employee’s supervisor, acting with a discriminatory
motivation, instigates the employer, who may have had no discriminatory
feelings toward the employee, to terminate or implement an adverse
employment decision against the employee. A lack of any discriminatory
sentiments on the part of the employer is irrelevant; instead, the discriminatory
motive of the supervisor, who himself lacks the authority to terminate or
adversely affect the employee’s terms of employment, is imputed to the
employer. The term cat’s paw comes from the fable “The Monkey and the Cat,”
written by the 17th century French poet Jean de La Fontaine, which references a
monkey manipulating a cat to fulfill the monkey’s goal.). See also Staub, 131 S.
Ct. at 1191 (“A person who is a member of . . . or has an obligation to perform
service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment,
reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of
employment by an employer on the basis of that membership . . . or
obligation.”). Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006) (USERRA provides that “an
employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . under
subsection (a), if the person’s membership . . . is a motivating factor in the
employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have
been taken in the absence of such membership.”), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),
(m) (2006) (Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of . . . race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin” and provides that discrimination occurs when
one of these factors “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
140. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.
141. Id. at 1193.
142. Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct.
983, 989 (2010)).
143. Id. at 1194.
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equally to Title VII as to USERRA.144 Because Title VII has
become increasingly tort-like through the actions of Congress and
the Supreme Court, the Court should analogize to general tort law
for Title VII claims.145 The Court in Staub sought to determine a
party’s liability for an injury caused by more than one actor—
precisely the type of situation in which a proximate cause
determination is applied in tort law. Similarly, third-party standing
for Title VII retaliation claims hinges on whether a particular
plaintiff may sue for an injury inflicted on someone else.146 This
potential plaintiff is not the intended subject of retaliation; he
merely incurs the collateral damage of the employer’s intended
retaliation against a coworker.147
Like a third-party retaliation plaintiff, an NIED plaintiff, by
definition, suffers no physical damage from the incident that
causes injury but sustains only secondary effects of the occurrence.
Therefore, the bystander-damages standard serves as an
appropriate model for the third-party plaintiff’s standard. It
accomplishes the same objective as a standard for third-party
standing in a Title VII retaliation claim. Courts developed the
NIED standard because they “have realized that recognition of a
cause of action for [NIED] holds out the very real possibility of
nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants.”148
Similar reasons necessitate a standard for third-party standing in
Title VII retaliation claims. Without such a standard, employers
are subject to an immeasurable number of Title VII retaliation
claims and have no ability to predict which classes of plaintiffs
may file them. Employers, therefore, need a standard determining
third-party standing for Title VII retaliation claims, and principles
of NIED make it an appropriate source from which to extract this
standard because of their applicability to third-party retaliation
claims.

144. Id. at 1191.
145. See discussion supra Part I.A.
146. Admittedly, NIED is a standard governing claims of negligence;
whereas, Title VII retaliation claims result from intentional behavior. However,
this difference does not affect the applicability of the NIED to Title VII
retaliation claims because the proposed standard merely addresses standing.
Further judicial proceedings, therefore, entail the factual determination of the
claim’s underlying merits, including the defendant’s fault. This standard, in
contrast, only governs the eligibility of plaintiffs to file claims.
147. In a third-party retaliation claim, the employer intends to retaliate
against the employee who initially engaged in the protected action by taking
action to harm the third party.
148. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994).
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C. Tort Standard for NIED Claims and Its Application to ThirdParty Title VII Retaliation Plaintiffs
The United States Supreme Court assessed claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall.149 The Court
commented that “most States recognize a common-law cause of
action for [NIED], but limit recovery to certain classes of plaintiffs
or categories of claims through the application of one or more
tests.”150 The Court described three tests for bystander-damage
claims that the states apply: (1) the physical impact test; (2) the
zone of danger test; and (3) the relative bystander test.151 Most
states have abandoned the once prevalent physical impact test in
favor of the zone of danger test or the relative bystander test.
While the zone of danger test emerged in 1908 and remains the law
in several states, a plurality of states now follows the relative
bystander test first articulated in 1968.152
The relative bystander test for NIED claims originated with the
1968 California case Dillon v. Legg, in which a plaintiff recovered
for emotional distress after observing the death of her daughter.153
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court established that a
defendant would be liable for bystander damages to a plaintiff (1)
who was at the location of the incident when it occurred; (2) who
was closely related to the victim; and (3) whose emotional distress
was caused by his contemporaneous observation of the accident.154
149. Id. at 537.
150. Id.
151. Id. (The physical impact test requires a plaintiff claiming NIED to have
contemporaneously suffered a physical impact or injury because of the
defendant’s negligence.); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (A plaintiff
seeking damages for NIED under the zone of danger test, must have been in
sufficiently close proximity to the negligent actor to have a reasonable fear for
his own safety to result in a physical injury arising from his emotional distress.).
152. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 547.
153. Dillon, 441 P.2d 912.
154. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1977) (providing
that a plaintiff may recover against a negligent actor when the plaintiff suffers a
physical injury as a result of his emotional distress, which was prompted by the
actor’s negligent infliction of harm or peril on a member of the plaintiff’s
immediate family in the plaintiff’s presence). Illustration 3 in the relevant
Restatement section explains this point as follows:
A negligently leaves a truck insecurely parked at the top of a hill.
Because of this negligence the truck starts down the hill. B and C, her
child, are in the street in the path of the truck. The truck swerves,
misses B, and strikes C. B, who is watching C, does not see the truck
coming, and is not alarmed for her own safety, but suffers severe shock
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These three Dillon factors neatly apply to third-party Title VII
retaliation claims because retaliation claims likewise entail spatial,
relational, and temporal analyses.155 Thus, a third party who fulfills
spatial, relational, and temporal requirements derived from those
applied to NIED claims should have standing to file Title VII
retaliation claims. Finally, the prevalence and relative modernity of
the Dillon test156 support the use of its elements as a basis for a
standard for third-party retaliation claims.
1. Relational Requirement
The Dillon test provides that a plaintiff may only recover
against a defendant whose negligence caused harm or danger to the
plaintiff’s immediate family member.157 This NIED requirement
limits the tortfeasor’s otherwise indefinite liability.158 Similarly, a
relational requirement for third-party retaliation plaintiffs would
ameliorate employers’ current plight of unpredictable liability. The
Thompson Court’s statement that “firing a close family member”
would “almost always” be unlawful, while “inflicting a milder
reprisal on a mere acquaintance” would “almost never” be
unlawful further supports this element’s application to third-party
retaliation plaintiffs.159 Because of the close relationship that
family members can be presumed to share, an employer would
likely assume that an employee will be most significantly affected
by retaliation targeting his family members, rather than other
coworkers. Thus, family members are the most likely third parties
to suffer retaliation. Similarly, because of family members’ close
relationships, a family member is more likely than any other
bystander to suffer severe emotional distress at observing a victim
sustain an injury. It is therefore logical and appropriate to apply the
standard of familial relationship utilized in bystander-damage
claims to third-party retaliation plaintiffs.
Because NIED is a state law claim, the familial relationship
that must exist between the bystander and the actual victim varies
from state to state.160 While Dillon created the tort and laid out its
and resulting serious illness at the sight of the injury to C. A is subject
to liability to B for the shock and her illness.
Id. at. illus. 3.
155. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
156. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 548–49.
157. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
158. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 546.
159. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
160. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1(a–c).
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basic elements,161 its ambiguity as to the required relationship has
prompted most states to define precisely which relationships
qualify.162 For example, when Louisiana first adopted a cause of
action for bystander damages in Lejeune v. Rayne Hospital, the
Louisiana Supreme Court failed to specify a class of potential
plaintiffs,163 as did the United States Supreme Court in
Thompson.164 With language similar to that included in
Thompson,165 the Lejeune court chose to “leave for another day a
decision whether recovery should be allowed only for close
relatives (and if so, which ones), or rather, for those with simply a
close relationship to the victim.”166 Shortly after this decision, the
Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6,
which specified the particular relationships that would qualify for
bystander damages.
a. Blood Relatives within the Second Degree of Consanguinity
New York and Michigan apply the strictest standard to the
relationship requirement of bystander-damage claims, allowing
spouses, children, and parents to recover, while barring more
distant relatives from recovery.167 In addition to plaintiffs in these
classes, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wisconsin also allow
siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren to recover.168
161. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912. Prior to this case, plaintiffs could only recover
for bystander damages when they were within the “zone of danger,” meaning
that they were in sufficiently close proximity to the negligent actor to have a
reasonable fear for their own safety to result in a physical injury arising from
their emotional distress.
162. See Dale J. Gilsinger, Relationship Between Victim and PlaintiffWitness As Affecting Right to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander
Plaintiff Is Not Member of Victim’s Immediate Family, 98 A.L.R. 5TH 609
(2002).
163. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570–71 (La. 1990).
164. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
165. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
166. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570–71.
167. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 849–50 (N.Y. 1984); Trombetta v.
Conkling, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying bystander
damages to victim’s aunt), aff'd, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993). See also Blanyar
v. Pagnotti Enters., Inc., 679 A.2d 790, 793–94 (Pa. 1996), aff'd, 710 A.2d 608
(1998) (suggesting that Pennsylvania may apply New York’s relationship
standard in claims of NIED); Gustafson v. Faris, 241 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976); Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Maldonado v. Nat’l Acme Co., 73 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 1996).
168. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.6 (2012); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104,
108 (Iowa 1981); Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 781
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b. Relatives of Varying Degrees of Consanguinity
In addition to spouses, parents, siblings, children, and
grandparents, California and Texas permit NIED recovery by other
relatives as long as they live in the same household as the
victim.169 Nebraska specifically includes aunts and uncles, with no
requirement of residency, but cautions that they, along with
grandparents, shoulder “a heavier burden of proving a significant
attachment” to the victim.170 Alaska,171 Arizona,172 Connecticut,173
Florida,174 Indiana,175 Maine,176 Nebraska,177 Nevada,178 and West

(N.M. 1998); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (N.M. 1983); Bowen v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 444 (Wis. 1994).
169. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 584 (Cal. 1988); Thing v. La Chusa,
771 P.2d 814, 829 n.10 (Cal. 1989); Garcia v. San Antonio Hous. Auth., 859
S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. App. 1993).
170. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985).
171. Kallstrom v. U.S., 43 P.3d 162, 163 (Alaska 2002).
172. Hislop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 5 P.3d
267, 269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (In dicta, the court suggested that “something
closely akin” to a familial relationship may also suffice.); Keck v. Jackson, 593
P.2d 668, 670 (Ariz. 1979) (establishing Arizona’s bystander-damages law).
173. Biercevicz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 865 A.2d 1267, 1271–72 (Conn.
2004) (denying bystander damages to victim’s fiancée); Batista v. Backus, No.
CV000159533, 2000 WL 1862879, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000)
(denying bystander damages to victim’s friend).
174. Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1297
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (denying bystander damages to victim’s fiancée);
Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1985) (requiring close relationship
between victim and bystander).
175. Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656, 661–62 (Ind. 2007) (denying
bystander damages to a fiancée).
176. Nelson v. Flanagan, 677 A.2d 545, 548 (Me. 1996) (allowing spouse’s
claim of bystander damages). See also Michaud v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 715
A.2d 955, 959 (Me. 1998) (barring recovery by plaintiff unrelated to the victim).
But see Magruder v. Sawyer, No. CIV. 99-0077-B, 1999 WL 33117074, at *1
(D. Me. Dec. 6, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss fiancé’s claim of NIED).
177. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985). Though the court
stated that aunts, uncles, and grandparents have a higher burden of proof than
closer relatives, it left the relationship standard open to any plaintiff who can
prove to be a victim’s close relative or spouse.
178. Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1999) (“Immediate family
members of the victim qualify for standing to bring NIED claims as a matter of
law,” whereas, “when the family relationship between the victim and the
bystander is beyond the immediate family, the fact finder should assess the
nature and quality of the relationship and, therefrom, determine as a factual
matter whether the relationship is close enough to confer standing.”).
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Virginia179 additionally limit recovery to spouses or relatives but
do not require a specific degree of consanguinity for recovery.
c. Close but Unrelated Parties
Some states allow even unrelated parties to recover bystander
damages.180 Hawaii courts adopt a more liberal construction of
bystander damages, holding that the absence of a blood
relationship between a victim and bystander does not foreclose
recovery.181 Rejecting formalism, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
and New Jersey allow a fiancé who cohabitates with the victim to
sue for NIED.182 Additionally, Massachusetts acknowledges that a
party who is unrelated to the victim may nevertheless be eligible to
recover bystander damages, emphasizing that only a “familial or
other relationship” is required.183 Finally, Tennessee does not
require any relationship between the plaintiff and victim and
instead considers the nature of the relationship as part of the
calculation of damages.184

179. Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157, 162–63 (W. Va. 1992).
180. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974) (allowing plaintiff
to prove nature of relationship with victim); Yovino v. Big Bubba’s BBQ, LLC,
896 A.2d 161, 165–67 (Conn. 2006); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262
(N.H. 2003) (allowing recovery by victim’s fiancée who had lived with him for
seven years). But see St. Onge v. MacDonald, 917 A.2d 233, 235 (N.H. 2007)
(denying recovery by victim’s boyfriend of six months when the couple had
made no commitments to marry or cohabitate); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d
372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
181. Leong, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (allowing plaintiff to prove nature of
relationship with victim).
182. Yovino, 896 A.2d at 165–67; Graves, 818 A.2d at 1260–62. But see St.
Onge, 917 A.2d at 235; Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380; Thurmon v. Sellers, 62
S.W.3d 145, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,
439–40, 496 (Tenn. 1996) (allowing recovery by plaintiff who was complete
stranger to victim).
183. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978)
(emphasis added) (establishing that bystander-damage plaintiff must have “a
close familial or other relationship” with victim to recover); Richmond v.
Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 WL 1146885 (Mass. Aug. 8, 1995) (suggesting
that a victim’s fiancé may be eligible to recover bystander damages).
184. Thurmon, 62 S.W.3d at 164. See also Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 437. The
listing of states whose requirements are discussed throughout Part IV.C.1(a–c) is
not exhaustive but is instead illustrative of the approaches followed by the
majority of states.
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d. Proposed Relational Requirement for Third-Party Title VII
Claims
By allowing a fiancé to file a Title VII retaliation claim, the
Thompson Court adopted a broader relational requirement than
states that require bystander-damages plaintiffs and victims to be
second-degree blood relatives.185 Fiancés are nearly family
members but are not yet technically related; thus, courts that allow
fiancés’ bystander-damage claims also allow claims by both close
and more distant relatives. Therefore, a fortiori, all classes of
relatives, in addition to fiancés, should be able to file Title VII
retaliation claims.186 The inclusion of this class adheres to the
Supreme Court’s broad construction in Thompson.187 It is,
however, imperative to balance the Court’s intent against the
policy objective of establishing a class of plaintiffs whose claims
employers can reasonably expect. Therefore, the adoption of
Tennessee’s liberal approach, allowing any party to file claims and
only considering relationship as a factor in the calculation of
damages, would fail to satisfy this objective.188 Granting an
unspecified “other relationship” automatic standing for third-party
retaliation claims would likewise fall short.189 Based on the
rationale behind underlying states’ relational requirements for
NIED claims, and the Court’s articulated intent in Thompson,
relatives and fiancés of the initial Title VII claimants should be
eligible to file Title VII retaliation claims against their
employers.190 This standard will create a sufficiently broad class of
third-party plaintiffs that will effectively strike a balance between
Title VII’s and employers’ competing interests.
2. Temporal Requirement
In addition to its relational requirement, the Dillon test requires
that a plaintiff have contemporaneously observed the accident.191
This constraint serves to increase the foreseeability of the
185. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
186. The term relative, as used in the proposed relational requirement, should
be read to include both blood and legal relatives, i.e., relatives through adoption
or marriage.
187. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
188. Thurmon, 62 S.W.3d at 164. See also Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 437.
189. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978);
Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 WL 1146885 (Mass. Aug. 8,
1995).
190. See discussion supra Part IV.1(a–c); Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 863.
191. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920–21 (Cal. 1968).
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plaintiff’s harm (and, thereby, future claim), as well as to decrease
the possibility of fraudulent claims.192 These considerations also
apply to Title VII retaliation claims, but a contemporaneousobservation requirement would be arbitrary and useless for Title
VII claims. First, the Title VII-protected activity forming the basis
of the retaliation complaint might have easily been performed
privately. Furthermore, in most cases, employees file EEOC
complaints before employers even receive notice of them.
Additionally, even if a retaliation plaintiff did observe his
coworker’s participation in protected activity, the plaintiff’s
presence or absence would not likely affect the employer’s
decision to retaliate.
A more relevant temporal consideration instead examines the
time that has elapsed between the employer’s receipt of notice that
an employee engaged in a Title VII-protected activity and the
alleged retaliation. Common sense suggests that the probability
that an employer acted with a retaliatory motive is greater when a
short time passes between the two events than when more time has
elapsed. Therefore, courts should consider the length of time
between notice of the protected activity and the alleged retaliation
when determining the facial validity of a third-party plaintiff’s
Title VII retaliation claim.
3. Spatial Requirement
The remaining element of the Dillon test requires a plaintiff’s
presence at the scene of the accident.193 This element is relevant to
third-party retaliation claims, but less so than relationship and
time. A bystander who witnesses a traumatic accident would be
more likely affected by it if he observed it from nearby, rather than
from a great distance. Observing a gruesome accident would
logically be more likely to cause anguish to the bystander if he
watches in clearer detail than if he could see only a hazy image.
Similarly, it is more probable that an employer would act with a
retaliatory motive against a coworker who works more closely
with the Title VII claimant’s coworker than against an employee
who works in a different office. Therefore, courts should note the
proximity in which the employees work when deciding whether to
allow a third-party plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The proximity of the
employees, however, is not dispositive of retaliation, and should
thus be treated as a consideration, rather than a strict requirement.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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4. Standing for Third-Party Title VII Retaliation Plaintiffs
In Thompson, the Court addressed two questions: whether
Thompson’s retaliation claim was actionable and whether
Thompson had standing to bring the claim.194 The standard
proposed by this Comment addresses the Court’s second
inquiry.195 In granting third-party plaintiffs standing for Title VII
retaliation claims, the Court created a new class of plaintiffs, so
this Comment seeks to set parameters for that class.196 Based on
this proposed standard, a third-party plaintiff should have standing
if he satisfies the relational, temporal, and spatial requirements—
that is, if (1) he is a relative or fiancé of the initial claimant; (2) the
alleged retaliation occurred shortly after the initial protected
activity; and (3) he worked closely with the initial claimant. These
factors were drawn from NIED, and, while the tort principle serves
as a useful basis for defining third-party standing for Title VII
retaliation claimants, a significant distinction between the two
exists.
Whereas NIED defendants inflict injury negligently, Title VII
retaliation defendants cause damage intentionally. Thus, while it is
important to limit employers’ liability for Title VII retaliation
claims to protect employers from unpredictable frivolous
allegations, employers should not be given free rein to retaliate
against individuals not covered by this standard. If an employer
retaliates against an employee whom this standard excludes, that
employee should nevertheless have the opportunity to sue if he can
prove the facial validity of his claim.
The purpose of the proposed standard is to instill more
certainty for third-party Title VII retaliation claims than presently
exists in the wake of Thompson.197 Admittedly, permitting a
plaintiff excluded by this standard to file a Title VII retaliation
claim based on some other justification will preserve some
measure of uncertainty in these claims. Allowing a narrow
exception to this standard, however, conforms to the Supreme
Court’s expansive construction of Title VII retaliation claims
because it will prevent employers from retaliating with impunity
against employees excluded by the proposed standard.198 The
policy considerations supporting the need for a precaution against
this type of employer behavior therefore warrant the slight measure
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
See discussion supra Part I.C; Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
See discussion supra Part I.C; Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
See id.
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of uncertainty inherent in this exception. This justification is
further bolstered by the common-sense notion that an employer
should reasonably anticipate Title VII claims from employees
against whom it actually does retaliate. Finally, the inherent
concern for employee protection espoused by Title VII underscores
the need for an avenue of relief for employees who do not satisfy
the proposed standard but who can nevertheless prove retaliation.
Accordingly, courts should presume that third-party plaintiffs who
fail to meet the proposed standard lack standing for Title VII
retaliation claims unless they can present sufficient evidence of
retaliation. Because these plaintiffs must overcome their presumed
lack of standing, their claims will only be recognized if a court
deems their circumstances compelling enough to merit standing.
Allowing plaintiffs this opportunity, then, will not undermine the
rationale underlying the proposed relational, temporal, and spatial
requirements because it will still support the ultimate goal of
shielding employers from unpredictable claims.
Courts should therefore apply the standard proposed by this
Comment as a rebuttable presumption. If a third-party plaintiff
does not meet the stated criteria, he should be presumed to lack
standing for a Title VII retaliation claim. He may, however, rebut
this presumption if he can make a prima facie showing that his
claim is valid based on any of the following factors: (1) evidence
of employer’s knowledge of a close relationship between the
plaintiff and the coworker who engaged in protected activity;199 (2)
comparative evidence indicating that no reason other than
retaliation motivated the employer’s action; (3) evidence of pretext
for retaliation; or (4) direct evidence of retaliation.
In “declin[ing] to identify a fixed class of relationships for
which third-party reprisals are unlawful,” the Thompson Court
refused to exclude plaintiffs who may have valid claims based on
“particular circumstances.”200 Relatives and fiancés are more likely
targets of retaliation than other individuals; however, unrelated
coworkers may also share an extremely close relationship of which
their employer is aware. So, a plaintiff should be able to rebut the
presumption that he lacks standing by demonstrating his
employer’s knowledge of a relationship similarly close to a
familial one between the plaintiff and the initial Title VII claimant.
Similarly, a third-party plaintiff may rebut his presumed lack of
standing with comparative evidence indicating retaliation.
199. This factor refers to a close relationship other than a familial one—for
example, an unmarried but cohabitating couple. See discussion supra Part
III.C.1.d.
200. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
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Comparative evidence consists of similarly situated individuals
receiving different treatment from their employers such that no
reason other than discrimination could have caused the
difference.201 Plaintiffs commonly use this form of evidence to
prove allegations of employment discrimination.202 Thus, a thirdparty plaintiff should be allowed to present comparative evidence
to demonstrate that his employer’s only possible motivation for an
adverse employment action was retaliation.
A third-party plaintiff may additionally establish standing by
demonstrating that his employer’s articulated reason for taking
adverse action against him is a pretext for retaliation. Employment
discrimination plaintiffs can recover if they prove that their
employers’ stated motives are pretexts for discrimination.203 Thirdparty plaintiffs should also have standing for Title VII retaliation
claims if they can likewise establish that their employers’
justification for the alleged retaliation is, in fact, a pretext.
Finally, a third-party plaintiff should be able to establish
standing with direct evidence of retaliation. Direct evidence
consists of “explicit statements or smoking gun memos”—that is,
an employer’s explicit acknowledgement of a retaliatory motive.204
Courts frequently allow plaintiffs to use direct evidence to prove
allegations of employment discrimination.205 Accordingly, a thirdparty plaintiff’s Title VII claim certainly should not be excluded if
he has direct evidence, such as an email discussing a plan to fire
him in retaliation for his coworker’s protected activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII retaliation
claims to include third-party plaintiffs in Thompson may have
surprised some courts, the decision nevertheless conforms to its
recent trend of increasing the types of claims that plaintiffs may
bring under Title VII.206 In failing to propose a standard for these
third-party retaliation claims, however, the Court unfairly exposed
201. William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,”
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV.
305, 324–25 (1996).
202. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU
L. REV. 81, 98 (2009).
203. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing
pretext analysis in discrimination case).
204. Corbett, supra note 201, at 323–25.
205. Id. at 323.
206. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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employers to liability for an immeasurable number of potential
lawsuits from an unpredictable range of plaintiffs. Employers thus
need a standard governing third-party retaliation claims.
Tort law principles determining which plaintiffs are eligible to
sue for bystander damages provide a logical basis for defining
permissible third-party retaliation plaintiffs. Following tort law
principles of various states, a sufficiently broad group of thirdparty plaintiffs becomes evident. Under this standard, then, third
parties who should be able to sue their employers for Title VII
retaliation claims include relatives and fiancés. When determining
whether a third-party plaintiff may file a Title VII retaliation claim,
courts should also consider the time that elapsed between the
employer’s notice of the employee’s protected activity and the
alleged retaliation. Finally, courts should consider the proximity in
which the coworkers work.
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this standard, he should
nevertheless have the ability to rebut his presumed lack of
standing. A third-party plaintiff should then have standing if he
demonstrates (1) evidence of employer’s knowledge of a close
relationship between the plaintiff and the coworker who engaged
in protected activity; (2) comparative evidence indicating that no
reason other than retaliation motivated the employer’s action; (3)
evidence of pretext for retaliation; or (4) direct evidence of
retaliation. Limiting the class of third-party plaintiffs to this group
of individuals will simultaneously fulfill the policy goals of Title
VII and protect employers from unforeseen litigation. This will
allow employers to implement the employment decisions
necessary for the effective facilitation of their business operations.
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